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Abstract—Suppose that a rumor originating from a single
source among a set of suspects spreads in a network, how to
root out this rumor source? With the a priori knowledge of the
set of suspect nodes and a snapshot observation of infected nodes,
we construct a maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimator to identify
the rumor source using the susceptible-infected (SI) model. When
analyzing the performance of the MAP estimator, the a priori
suspect set and its associated connectivity in the network bring
about new ingredients to the problem. For this purpose, we
propose to use local rumor center, which is a generalized concept
based on the notion of rumor centrality, to identify the source
from suspects. For regular tree-type networks with node degree
δ, we characterize Pc(n), the correct detection probability of
the source estimator upon observing n infected nodes, in both
the finite and asymptotic regimes. First, when the suspect set
degenerates into the entirety of the network, so that every infected
node belongs to the suspect set, limn→∞ Pc(n) grows from 0.25
to 0.307 as δ increases from three to infinity, a result first
established in Shah and Zaman (2011, 2012) via a different
approach with more mathematical machinery; furthermore, Pc(n)
monotonically decreases with n and increases with δ even in
the finite-n regime. Second, when the suspect nodes form a
connected subgraph of the network, limn→∞ Pc(n) significantly
exceeds the a priori probability if δ ≥ 3, and reliable detection
is achieved as δ becomes sufficiently large; furthermore, Pc(n)
monotonically decreases with n and increases with δ. Third, when
there are only two suspect nodes, limn→∞ Pc(n) is at least 0.75 if
δ ≥ 3; and Pc(n) increases with the distance between the two
suspects. Fourth, when there are multiple suspect nodes, among
all possible connection patterns, that all the suspects form a
single connected subgraph of the network achieves the smallest
detection probability for the MAP source estimator. Our analysis
leverages ideas from the Po´lya’s urn model in probability theory
and sheds insight into the behavior of the rumor spreading
process not only in the asymptotic regime but also for the general
finite-n regime.
Index Terms—Epidemiology detection, maximum a posteriori
estimation, Po´lya’s urn model, rumor spreading, social network,
susceptible-infected model.
I. Introduction
Spreading of epidemics and information cascades through
social networks is ubiquitous in the modern world [1], [2].
Examples include the propagation of infectious diseases, in-
formation diffusion in the Internet, tweeting and retweeting of
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popular Twitter topics. In general, any of these situations can
be modeled as an epidemic-like rumor spreading in a network
[3], [4]. A key challenge is to identify the rumor source by
leveraging the network topology, suspect characteristics and
the observation of infected nodes. Finding this rumor source
has practical applications and also allows us to better under-
stand the role of the network in the spreading amplification
effect.
In practical scenarios, there is often a priori knowledge
that certain nodes are more likely to be the rumor source
and the others are less likely so. Indeed, there are many
situations where only a portion of nodes in the network
have the potential to initiate the rumor spreading. When an
infectious disease is spread, the frequent travellers from earlier
infected cities have a higher suspicion of causing an epidemic
outbreak in a new city. When a network of water pipes is
polluted by microorganisms or chemical substances, only the
suspicious vulnerable points need to be examined to identify
the pollution source. When the cyberspace is hit by rumors
or computer viruses, most of the victims are in fact innocent
and thus not all victims should be suspected as the culprit.
Therefore, it is not necessary to treat every infected node as the
possible rumor source when identifying the source. Hereafter,
we call the nodes that have the potential to initiate the rumor
spreading in a network as suspect nodes. Indeed, as we will
see in this paper, the suspect characteristics significantly affect
detectability, and add an interesting dimension to identifying
the source reliably.
In this paper, we consider the issue of reliably identifying
a single rumor source from among a number of suspects,
conditioned on a snapshot observation of infected nodes in
a network. The rumor spreading process is modeled by the
susceptible-infected (SI) model, a special case of the gen-
eral susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model for infectious
disease spreading [4]. In the SI model, there are two types
of nodes: i) susceptible nodes that are capable of becoming
infected, ii) infected nodes that can spread the rumor; and
spreading occurs in a cascading manner, i.e., once a susceptible
node gets infected by its neighbor, it remains infected (having
the rumor) and in turn may infect its other susceptible neigh-
bors. Our goal is to identify the rumor source based only on the
knowledge of network structure, the set of suspect nodes and
the snapshot observation of the infected nodes. The a priori
suspect set and its characteristics like connectivity bring about
new ingredients and challenges to the detection problem.
A. Related Works
Over the past decade, abundant works have dealt with the
problems on epidemic outbreaks across networks. The main
focus has been to understand the impacts of network structure
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2and the infection/cure rates of diffusion processes, such as in
[5]–[9]. Besides, many researchers have developed network in-
ference techniques to learn the underlying network parameters
and predict the propagation characteristics, such as in [10]–
[13]. In addition, the issue of extracting the influential source
nodes for epidemic spreadings has also been considered, such
as in [1], [14], [15].
The rumor source estimation problem has only been recently
studied in the pioneering work [3], [16] for a single rumor
source identification using the SI model. In particular, for
regular tree-type networks, [3], [16] proposed a maximum
likelihood (ML) estimator and derived its asymptotic perfor-
mance. When the node degree δ = 2, i.e., for a linear network,
the asymptotic correct detection probability is zero; when
δ = 3, it is 0.25; when δ > 3, it is a positive constant value
φ1(δ), which approaches 0.307 as δ grows large. Besides, other
types of networks and models have also been considered, such
as geometric trees [3], random graphs [17], identification of
multiple rumor sources in the SI model [18] and its counterpart
in the SIR model [19], and noisy estimation of a single source
[20]. However, all these works assume that every node in the
network has the potential to initiate the rumor spreading.
B. Our Contributions
In this paper, we study the single rumor source estimation
problem with the a priori knowledge that the rumor source
is restricted to a specified suspect set S of suspect nodes in
a network G. We construct a maximum a posteriori (MAP)
estimator to identify the rumor source, and focus on the
analysis of Pc(n), the correct detection probability of the
estimator upon observing n infected nodes. For regular tree-
type networks with node degree δ, we characterize Pc(n) in
the finite and the asymptotic (with the number of infected
nodes tending large) regimes, using the Po´lya’s urn model
in probability theory [21] and assuming a uniform a priori
distribution of the suspects in S . To handle the analysis of
the MAP estimator, we develop a key concept of local rumor
center, which generalizes the notion of rumor centrality in [3]
and proves to be a handy tool considerably facilitating the
analysis. We also highlight new insights for the detection in
general networks with suspects. We find that the introduction
of the a priori knowledge of suspect set substantially enriches,
rather than simplifies, the rumor source estimation problem.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
1) When S contains all the nodes in G, our estimator
reduces to that in [3], [16], recovering the same asymptotic
detection performance results on Pc(n) as theirs. Our proofs are
different and appear to be more natural intuitively, requiring
less mathematical machinery. Furthermore, we obtain exact
detection performance results on Pc(n) for regular trees with
any finite n and δ. In addition, we prove that Pc(n) monoton-
ically decreases with n and increases with δ even in the finite
regime. This result formalizes our intuition that the earlier the
observation is made the more reliable it is to estimate the
rumor source.
2) In the case where S with cardinality k forms a connected
subgraph of G, we obtain exact detection performance results
on Pc(n) for regular trees in both finite and asymptotic regimes.
Asymptotically, limn→∞ Pc(n) is always a positive constant
value φ2(δ, k). Notably, φ2(δ, k) significantly exceeds the a
priori probability 1/k for regular trees with degree larger than
two, and is at least 1/2 even with arbitrarily large cardinality
k. Furthermore, the MAP estimator achieves reliable detection,
i.e., limn→∞ Pc(n) → 1 as δ grows sufficiently large. We also
prove that Pc(n) monotonically decreases with n and increases
with δ even in the finite regime. It is a striking observation that
Pc(n) is at least 1/2 (with δ > 2) given the a priori knowledge
of suspects — even for arbitrarily large k as long as it is
finite, in contrast to that Pc(n) is at most 1/2 with no a priori
knowledge in the case where every node in the network has the
potential to initiate the rumor spreading [3]. Along with the
analysis, we present an interpretation of that key observation.
3) In the case where S contains only two suspect nodes
separated by their shortest path distance d (measured by num-
ber of hops), we obtain exact detection performance results
on Pc(n) in the finite regime; and when δ ≥ 3, we show that
limn→∞ Pc(n) ≥ 0.75, which furthermore approaches one as δ
grows sufficiently large. In addition, Pc(n) increases with the
separation distance d for general regular trees.
4) When S with cardinality k forms a general subgraph of
G, we prove that the MAP estimator achieves the smallest
detection probability when all the suspects form a single
connected subgraph of G. This result formalizes our intuition
that the more clustered the suspects are the more difficult it is
to identify the rumor source.
C. Organization
First, Section II describes the framework of the SI rumor
spreading model and the MAP estimator to identify the rumor
source in general networks. Second, in Section III we establish
analytical results on the detection probability of the MAP
estimator for regular tree-type networks, under four represen-
tative scenarios. Third, we design and implement algorithms to
compute the exact detection probability of the MAP estimator
for regular tree-type networks in Section IV. Fourth, we carry
out simulation experiments to corroborate and illustrate our
analytical results in Section V. Finally we conclude the paper
in Section VI.
II. Rumor Spreading Model and Rumor Source Estimator
In this section, we describe the SI rumor spreading model,
give the MAP estimator for the rumor source in general
networks, and introduce the notion of local rumor center. To
facilitate the reader, we list the key parameters used in the
paper in Table I.
A. Rumor Spreading Model
In general, an undirected network G = (V, E) consists of a
set of nodes V and a set of edges E. The set of nodes V is
assumed countably infinite so as to avoid any boundary effect,
and any pair of nodes may infect each other if and only if
they are connected by an edge in E. The network is assumed
to be static, i.e., no node joins or leaves.
3TABLE I
Key Terms and Symbols
Symbol Definition
δ node degree
Gn snapshot observation of n infected nodes
T su subtree rooted at node u with node s as the source
R(u,Gn) rumor centrality of node u in Gn
S suspect set
si, i ∈ N+ suspect node
s∗ original rumor source
sˆ estimate of the rumor source
s rumor source by assumption
Ps(·) prior distribution of the rumor source over the suspects
PG(·)
probability distribution of an infection sample in the rumor
spreading process or an infection sample equivalently
constructed using the Po´lya’s urn model
Pc(·) correct detection probability
Pe(·) error detection probability, i.e., the complement of Pc(·)
Pe1(·) error detection probability by one specified subtree
We consider the case where only a single node in an a
priori specified suspect set S is the original rumor source who
initiates the infection process among the susceptible nodes in
G, where S = {s1, s2, · · · , sk} ⊆ V has cardinality k. Nodes in
S are called suspect nodes. We assume an a priori distribution
Ps of the rumor source over the nodes in S , and thus Ps(s)
denotes the probability that s ∈ S initiates the rumor spreading.
For normalization, we have
k∑
i=1
Ps(si) = 1. (1)
Throughout this paper, we assume a uniform distribution Ps
over the nodes in S , i.e., Ps(s) = 1/k for any s ∈ S .
Admittedly this uniform prior assumption is a restriction, but
we remark that our analysis can be extended to handle the
more general case of non-uniform priors, with slightly more
technical modifications.
The rumor spreading process in an SI model unfolds as
follows. Initially, only a single node s∗ ∈ S possesses a rumor
to spread over the network G. Once a node has the rumor, it is
termed as infected. An infected node may infect its neighbors,
independent of all the other nodes. Let τi j be the time it takes
for node j to receive the rumor from its neighbor i after i has
the rumor, where (i, j) ∈ E. We assume that {τi j, (i, j) ∈ E}
are mutually independent and exponentially distributed with a
normalized rate λ = 1 (without loss of generality).
B. Rumor Source Estimator: Maximum a Posteriori (MAP)
(1) MAP estimator
Suppose that a rumor originates from a node s∗ ∈ S . We
observe the network G at some point in time and find a
snapshot of n infected nodes, which are collectively denoted by
Gn. Due to the SI model, Gn must form a connected subgraph
of G and contain at least a node in S , which obviously includes
s∗. Our goal is to construct an estimator to identify a node sˆ
as the rumor source. The detection is correct if sˆ = s∗.
Now, conditioned on Gn, the source node has a uniform
distribution over the nodes in S
⋂
Gn to initiate the spreading.
Utilizing the Bayes’ rule, the maximum a posteriori (MAP)
1
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Fig. 1. Illustration of subtree T su .
estimator of s∗ maximizes the average correct detection prob-
ability and is given by
sˆ ∈ arg max
s∈{S ⋂Gn}PG (s|Gn)
= arg max
s∈{S ⋂Gn}
PG (Gn|s) Ps(s)
PG (Gn)
= arg max
s∈{S ⋂Gn}PG (Gn|s), (2)
where PG(Gn|s) is the probability of observing Gn assuming
s to be the rumor source. Note that a key difference from the
model in [3] is that in our work the rumor source resides in
a priori suspect set S ⊆ V . Naturally, we would first evaluate
PG (Gn|s) for all s ∈ {S ⋂Gn} and then pick the one with the
maximal value to be sˆ.
(2) Optimal MAP estimator for regular trees
In general, the evaluation of PG (Gn|s) may be computation-
ally prohibitive since it is related to counting the number of
linear extensions of a partially ordered set [3], [22]. Therefore,
we leverage the concept of rumor centrality, first introduced
in [3], which would enable an implementation of our estimator
using only O(n) computation steps. In particular, the optimal
MAP estimator for a regular tree is given by
sˆ ∈ arg max
s∈{S ⋂Gn}PG (Gn|s) = arg maxs∈{S ⋂Gn}R (s,Gn), (3)
where R(s,Gn) is the rumor centrality of node s in Gn, and
can be evaluated by
R(s,Gn) = n!
∏
u∈Gn
1
|T su | , (4)
where T su is the subtree rooted at node u with node s as the
source in Gn and
∣∣∣T su ∣∣∣ is the number of nodes in T su ; e.g., see
Fig. 1.
(3) Approximate estimator for general trees and graphs
For general trees, the estimator (3) with the rumor centrality
can be a reasonable heuristic. So, an approximate estimator is
given by
sˆ ∈ arg max
s∈{S ⋂Gn}R (s,Gn). (5)
Besides, a message-passing algorithm has been proposed in
[3] to compute the rumor centralities for all the nodes in a
general tree Gn with n nodes using only O(n) computation
steps. For general graphs, the estimator (3) using the rumor
centrality can be leveraged as a heuristic. Intuitively, a rumor
4tends to travel from the source to each infected node along
a minimum-distance path [3], [20], and thus we approximate
the diffusion tree by a breadth-first search (BFS) tree. So an
approximate estimator may be given by
sˆ ∈ arg max
s∈{S ⋂Gn}R (s,Tbfs(s)), (6)
where Tbfs(s) is the BFS tree with node s as its root in
a general graph Gn. The complexity of implementing (6) is
O(n3).
C. Local Rumor Center in General Trees
In the following, we develop a notion of local rumor center,
which enables an efficient implementation of the estimator (3)
and will be instrumental for our subsequent analysis. The local
rumor center may be viewed as a “conditional” rumor center,
and renders the performance analysis of the MAP estimator
(3) tractable. A useful recursive relationship is that, for any
two neighboring nodes u and v in a tree Gn [3],
R(u,Gn) = R(v,Gn)
∣∣∣T vu ∣∣∣
n − |T vu | . (7)
Now, consider a node ω with a neighbor set N(ω) and a
sub-neighborhood Nl(ω) ⊆ N(ω). If R(ω,Gn) ≥ R(u,Gn) for
all u ∈ Nl(ω), then ω is called the local rumor center with
respect to (w.r.t.) the sub-neighborhood Nl(ω) of Gn. More
precisely, the local rumor center is characterized as follows.
Proposition 1. i) Given a tree Gn of n nodes, if node ω is
the local rumor center w.r.t. a sub-neighborhood Nl(ω) ⊂ Gn,
then for any u ∈ Nl(ω), we have
∣∣∣Tωu ∣∣∣ ≤ n/2; and for any
u′ ∈ Tωu \ {u}, we have R(u′,Gn) < R(ω,Gn).
ii) If there is a node ω such that
∣∣∣Tωu ∣∣∣ ≤ n/2 for all u ∈ Nl(ω),
then ω is a local rumor center w.r.t. the sub-neighborhood
Nl(ω) ⊂ Gn.
iii) Furthermore, if node ω is the local rumor center w.r.t. a
sub-neighborhood Nl(ω) ⊂ Gn, then there is at most a node
u ∈ Nl(ω) such that R(u,Gn) = R(ω,Gn), which holds if and
only if
∣∣∣Tωu ∣∣∣ = n/2.
Remark 1: In fact, the local rumor center is a generalization
of the rumor center in [3], which is defined as the node with
the maximal rumor centrality in Gn. When Nl(ω) = N(ω), the
two notions coincide. However, the rumor center may belong
to the set Gn\S and thus is not the solution of the estimator (3).
Besides, note that we can find at most two local rumor centers
from a connected suspect set S w.r.t. the sub-neighborhood
restricted by S , when we are given Gn. The notion of local
rumor center not only generalizes the concept of rumor center,
but also will prove to be a key to tackle the MAP estimator
with suspects.
Proof of Proposition 1. First consider u ∈ Nl(ω). From (7),
we have
R(u,Gn)
R(ω,Gn)
=
∣∣∣Tωu ∣∣∣
n − |Tωu | . (8)
Since R(u,Gn) ≤ R(ω,Gn), we get
∣∣∣Tωu ∣∣∣ ≤ n/2.
Next, consider u′ ∈ Tωu \ {u}, and let P(u, u′) be the set of
nodes along the shortest path from u to u′, but not including
u. Repeatedly using (7), we have
R(u′,Gn)
R(u,Gn)
=
∏
v∈P(u,u′)
∣∣∣Tωv ∣∣∣
n − |Tωv | . (9)
Since
∣∣∣Tωu ∣∣∣ ≤ n/2, thus ∣∣∣Tωv ∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣Tωu ∣∣∣ ≤ n/2, i.e. ∣∣∣Tωv ∣∣∣ /(n −∣∣∣Tωv ∣∣∣) < 1 for all v ∈ P(u, u′). Therefore, R(u′,Gn) < R(u,Gn) ≤
R(ω,Gn). This proves Proposition 1-i.
Now for Proposition 1-ii, if
∣∣∣Tωu ∣∣∣ ≤ n/2, i.e.∣∣∣Tωu ∣∣∣/(n − ∣∣∣Tωu ∣∣∣) ≤ 1 for all u ∈ Nl(ω), then from (8),
we have R(u,Gn) ≤ R(ω,Gn). Therefore, ω is the local rumor
center w.r.t. its sub-neighborhood Nl(ω) ⊂ Gn.
As for Proposition 1-iii, if there is a node u ∈ Nl(ω) such
that R(u,Gn) = R(ω,Gn), then from (8), we have
∣∣∣Tωu ∣∣∣ = n/2;
the deduction holds backward. Besides, there can be at most
a subtree Tωu (u ∈ Nl(ω)) such that
∣∣∣Tωu ∣∣∣ = n/2, since the total
number of nodes in Gn is n and any two subtrees with ω as the
source are disjoint. As a result, if node ω is the local rumor
center w.r.t. a sub-neighborhood Nl(ω) ⊂ Gn and there has
already been a node u∗ ∈ Nl(ω) such that R(u∗,Gn) = R(ω,Gn),
then for all u ∈ Nl(ω)\{u∗} we have
∣∣∣Tωu ∣∣∣ < n/2, i.e., ∣∣∣Tωu ∣∣∣ /(n−∣∣∣Tωu ∣∣∣) < 1. Again, from (8), we have R(u,Gn) < R(ω,Gn). 
III. Detection Probability in Regular Trees: Analytical
Results
In this section, we analyze the performance of the MAP
estimator for regular tree-type networks. Four representative
scenarios are investigated: when the suspect set contains all
the nodes in the network, i.e., with no a priori knowledge;
when the suspect set forms a connected subgraph of the
network; when the suspect set contains only two nodes; when
the suspect set contains multiple nodes which are possibly
disconnected. In analysis we exploit the key fact that the
rumor spreading process on regular trees is equivalent to the
ball drawing process in the Po´lya’s urn model [21], and thus
establish the performance results of the MAP estimator in
both finite and asymptotically regimes. In the following, we
introduce our main results and provide their proofs.
A. Main Results
We focus on the correct detection probability Pc(n), the
probability of the MAP estimator correctly identifying the
rumor source from the suspect set S upon observing Gn of
n infected nodes in the network G = (V, E). For a regular tree
with node degree δ, we have the following four characteriza-
tions for Pc(n).
(1) The case where all nodes are suspects
In this case, S = V , every infected node in an observation
Gn has the potential to be the rumor source, i.e., without any a
priori knowledge. Assuming a node s∗ to be the rumor source
with δ neighbors v1, . . . , vδ, we could observe X j = x j (1 ≤
j ≤ δ) infected nodes in each subtree T s∗v j rooted at v j with s∗
as the source in Gn, where X j is a random variable; e.g., see
Fig. 2. Then, we will establish the following theorem.
5… …s
1 infected nodesx
…
2 infected nodesx
…
…
… …
3 infected nodesx
1v
2v
3v
Fig. 2. Illustration of X1 = x1, X2 = x2, X3 = x3 infected nodes in subtrees
T s
∗
v1 , T
s∗
v2 and T
s∗
v3 with s
∗ as the source on a regular tree G with node degree
δ = 3, respectively.
Theorem 2. Suppose S = V, i.e., every infected node is a
suspect node, then:
i) When δ = 2 (linear network),
Pc(n) =
1
2n−1
(
n − 1
b(n − 1)/2c
)
, (10)
and Pc(n) = O(1/√n) with sufficiently large n.
ii) When δ = 3,
Pc(n) =
1
4
+
3
4
1
2bn/2c + 1 , (11)
and Pc(n) = 0.25 + O(1/n) with sufficiently large n.
iii) When δ > 3, we use Algorithm 1 in Section IV to compute
the exact value of Pc(n) with finite n. Besides,
lim
n→∞Pc(n) = φ1(δ) := 1 − δ
(
1 − I1/2
(
1
δ − 2 ,
δ − 1
δ − 2
))
, (12)
where Ix(α, β) is the incomplete Beta function with parameters
α and β; and φ1(δ)→ 1 − ln 2 ≈ 0.307 as δ→ ∞.
Remark 2: When S = V , the MAP estimator (3) in effect
reduces to the ML estimator established in [3], [16].1 The
asymptotic parts of Theorem 2 have been established in [3],
[16] using a different approach from ours that explicitly relies
on the exponential distribution of the infection time. Therefore,
without any a priori knowledge, the estimator achieves a
strictly positive detection probability if the network is not
linear, but it is asymptotically upper bounded by 0.307.
(2) The case of connected suspects
In this case, S = {s1, . . . , sk} of cardinality k forms a
connected subgraph of G; e.g., see Fig. 3. With this a priori
knowledge, we will establish the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Suppose that S forms a connected subgraph of
G, then:
i) When δ = 2 (linear network),
Pc(n) =
1
k
(
1 +
k − 1
2n−1
(
n − 1
b(n − 1)/2c
))
, (13)
1Strictly speaking, our setup of a uniform a priori distribution of the rumor
source over S is not well defined when S = V , since V is a countably
infinite set. Our remedy is that we consider ML estimation for Theorem 2
thus returning to the setup in [3], [16], and consider MAP estimation for the
other two cases.
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8s 9s
Fig. 3. Illustration of a suspect set S = {s1, s2, . . . , s9} with multiple connected
suspect nodes on a regular tree G with node degree δ = 3. The nodes in S
form a connected subgraph of G.
and Pc(n) = 1/k + O(1/√n) with sufficiently large n.
ii) When δ = 3,
Pc(n) =
k + 1
2k
+
k − 1
k
1
4bn/2c + 2 , (14)
and Pc(n) = (k + 1)/(2k) + O(1/n) with sufficiently large n.
iii) When δ > 3, we use Algorithm 2 in Section IV to compute
the exact value of Pc(n) with finite n. Besides,
lim
n→∞Pc(n) = φ2(δ, k) := 1 −
2k − 2
k
(
1 − I1/2
(
1
δ − 2 ,
δ − 1
δ − 2
))
, (15)
where φ2(δ, k)→ 1 as δ→ ∞, and φ2(δ, k)→ 2I1/2
(
1
δ−2 ,
δ−1
δ−2
)
−
1 as k → ∞.
Remark 3: For linear networks, Pc(n) can barely exceed
the a priori probability 1/k. When δ ≥ 3, Pc(n) is at least
max{1/k, 1/2}, which is in sharp contrast to that Pc(n) is
at most 1/2 with no a priori knowledge as in Theorem 2.
Furthermore, the MAP estimator achieves reliable detection as
δ grows sufficiently large. Therefore, the performance of the
MAP estimator is significantly improved and reliable detection
can be achieved when the a priori knowledge on the suspect
nodes is given.
Remarkably, even with k → ∞ our results do not degenerate
to the case of no a priori knowledge. This is a seemingly
counter-intuitive fact, because one would expect that as k
grows large Theorem 3 would recover the results in Theorem
2 (and thus [3]). To understand this fact, the key is that, no
matter how large k is, the suspect set has a boundary in the
infinite regular tree network. Those suspect nodes nearby the
boundary are easier to identify than those further inside the
suspect set. Since the performance of the MAP estimator is
the correct detection probability averaged among all suspect
nodes, asymptotically reliable estimation can be attained, and
such a phenomenon is especially pronounced when the node
degree δ is large as then most of the suspect nodes are located
nearby the boundary. In particular, we need to note that this
scaling behavior does not rely on n; that is, k and n can
separately grow large, without dependency between each other,
— indeed k can grow even faster than n. We therefore believe
that Theorem 3 reveals a fundamental distinction between
the MAP and the ML estimation philosophies, and indicates
that the introduction of the a priori knowledge of suspect set
6… …1s … 2s
1 2( , )d s s d
… … … … … ……
… …
1v 2v 1dv
Fig. 4. Illustration of two suspect nodes with distance d on a regular tree G
with node degree δ = 3. There are d nodes from s1 to s2 excluding s1, which
are sequentially denoted by v1, v2, . . . , vd−1, vd = s2.
does enrich, rather than simplify, the rumor source estimation
problem.
(3) The case of two suspects
In this case, S contains only two suspect nodes s1 and s2.
We let d be their shortest path distance on G (i.e., the number
of hops from s1 to s2); e.g., see Fig. 4. Since we can obviously
ensure correct estimation of the source if d ≥ n, we assume d <
n. With this a priori knowledge of S , we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 4. Suppose S only contains two suspect nodes, and
denote by d their shortest path distance (d < n), then:
i) When δ = 2 (linear network),
Pc(n) =

1
2
− 1
2n
(n+d+1)/2∑
z1=(n−d−1)/2
(
n − 1
z1
)
, (n − d) is odd;
1
2
− 1
2n
(n+d−2)/2∑
z1=(n−d)/2
(
n − 1
z1
)
, (n − d) is even.
(16)
ii) When δ = 3, we use Algorithm 3 in Section IV to compute
the exact value of Pc(n) with finite n. Besides,
lim
n→∞Pc(n)
 = 0.75, d = 1,≈ 0.886, d = 2. (17)
iii) When δ > 3, we use Algorithm 3 in Section IV to compute
the exact value of Pc(n) with finite n. Besides,
lim
n→∞Pc(n) = φ3(δ) := I1/2
(
1
δ − 2 ,
δ − 1
δ − 2
)
, d = 1, (18)
and φ3(δ)→ 1 as δ→ ∞.
iv) In general, Pc(n) monotonically increases with d.
Remark 4: Theorem 4 formalizes our intuition that it is
more difficult to correctly identify the rumor source if the two
suspect nodes are closer. We see that when δ ≥ 3, the a priori
probability 1/2 can be significantly exceeded.
(4) The case of multiple suspects with general connectivity
In this case, S = {s1, . . . , sk} of cardinality k forms a general
subgraph of G; e.g., see Fig. 5. Note that this subgraph can
be disconnected in general. With the a priori knowledge of S ,
we will establish the following theorem.
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Fig. 5. Illustration of a suspect set S = {s1, s2, . . . , s9} with multiple suspect
nodes on a regular tree G with node degree δ = 3. The nodes in S form a
general subgraph of G.
Theorem 5. Suppose S contains k suspect nodes, then:
i) When δ = 2 (linear network),
Pc(n) ≥ 1k
(
1 +
k − 1
2n−1
(
n − 1
b(n − 1)/2c
))
, (19)
and Pc(n) ≥ 1/k + O(1/√n) with sufficiently large n.
ii) When δ = 3,
Pc(n) ≥ k + 12k +
k − 1
k
1
4bn/2c + 2 , (20)
and Pc(n) ≥ (k + 1)/(2k) + O(1/n) with sufficiently large n.
iii) When δ > 3,
lim
n→∞Pc(n) ≥ φ2(δ, k) := 1 −
2k − 2
k
(
1 − I1/2
(
1
δ − 2 ,
δ − 1
δ − 2
))
. (21)
iv) In general, Pc(n) is minimized, among all possible S ’s
with |S | = k, when the k suspect nodes constitute a connected
subgraph in G as in Theorem 3.
Remark 5: Theorem 5 can be established as a consequence
of Theorems 3 and 4. When there are k suspect nodes, the
MAP estimator achieves the smallest detection probability in
the scenario of Theorem 3. This result formalizes our intuition
that the more clustered the suspects are the more difficult it is
to identify the rumor source.
B. Equivalence to the Po´lya’s Urn Model
(1) Preliminaries
We first introduce the preliminaries on the Po´lya’s urn
model in probability theory, and then show that the rumor
spreading process on regular trees is equivalent to the ball
drawing process in the Po´lya’s urn model, a connection first
utilized in [16] for asymptotic analysis. Our approach is to
leverage it to derive exact detection probability in the more
general finite regime (recovering the asymptotic result as a
special case).
Po´lya’s urn model [21, Chap. 4]: initially, the urn contains
b j balls of color C j (1 ≤ j ≤ δ); at each uniform drawing of
a single ball, the ball is returned together with  balls of the
same color; after n drawings, the number X j is the number
of times that the balls of color C j are drawn. Then the joint
distribution of {X j, 1 ≤ j ≤ δ} is given by
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Fig. 6. The incomplete Beta function I1/2( 1δ−2 ,
δ−1
δ−2 ) vs. node degree δ.
PG
 δ⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
 = n!x1!x2! · · · xδ!
∏δ
j=1 b j(b j + ) · · · (b j + (x j − 1))
b(b + ) · · · (b + (n − 1)) ,
(22)
where b =
∑δ
j=1 b j and
∑δ
j=1 x j = n.
As n → ∞, the limiting joint distribution of the ratios
{X j/n, 1 ≤ j ≤ δ} converges to the Dirichlet distribution, whose
density function is given by
Γ(α)∏δ
j=1 Γ(α j)
δ∏
j=1
yα j−1j , (23)
where α j = b j/, α =
∑δ
j=1 α j and
∑δ
j=1 y j = 1. Here, Γ(α) is
the Gamma function with parameter α.
Besides, the marginal distribution of X1 is
PG (X1 = x1) =
n!
x′1!x
′
2!
∏2
j=1 b
′
j(b
′
j + ) · · · (b′j + (x′j − 1))
b(b + ) · · · (b + (n − 1)) ,
(24)
where b′1 = b1, b
′
2 = b − b1, x′1 = x1 and x′2 = n − x1. In fact,
it can be seen as a special case of the Po´lya’s urn model with
two colors.
As n → ∞, the limiting marginal distribution of the
ratio X1/n converges to the Beta distribution, whose density
function is given by
Γ(α′1 + α
′
2)
Γ(α′1)Γ(α
′
2)
yα
′
1−1
1 (1 − y1)α
′
2−1, (25)
where α′1 = α1 and α
′
2 = α − α1. In particular, we have
lim
n→∞PG
(X1
n
≤ x
)
= Ix(α′1, α
′
2)
:=
Γ(α′1 + α
′
2)
Γ(α′1)Γ(α
′
2)
∫ x
0
yα
′
1−1(1 − y)α′2−1dy, (26)
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Note that Ix(α′1, α′2) is called the incomplete
Beta function with parameters α′1 and α
′
2.
We are interested in I1/2(α′1, α
′
2) with parameters α
′
1 = 1/(δ−
2) and α′2 = (δ − 1)/(δ − 2), where δ is the node degree of a
regular tree and δ ≥ 3; e.g., see Fig. 6.
(2) Equivalence to the Po´lya’s urn model
Next, we show that the rumor spreading on regular trees can
be modeled by ball drawing in the Po´lya’s urn model, whose
known distributions are used to obtain Theorems 2-5.
For a rumor source s∗ with δ neighboring nodes v1, . . . , vδ,
let T s
∗
v j (1 ≤ j ≤ δ) be the subtree rooted at node v j with node
s∗ as the source in Gn, and define a random variable X j as
the number of nodes in T s
∗
v j ; e.g., see Fig. 2. We denote the
set of susceptible neighbors of infected nodes as the rumor
boundary. In the rumor spreading process, nodes in Gn are
infected sequentially, and thus we have the following: initially,
s∗ has one neighbor in each subtree T s∗v j (1 ≤ j ≤ δ) that
belongs to the rumor boundary; after one of those nodes
is infected, it introduces δ − 1 new nodes into the rumor
boundary; finally, n − 1 nodes are infected besides s∗. Due to
the memoryless property of exponential distribution and the
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) property of the
infection times {τi j, (i, j) ∈ E}, in each step, the infected node
is uniformly selected from the rumor boundary.
Now, the resulting infection Gn with X j nodes in T s
∗
v j (1 ≤
j ≤ δ) can be constructed in an equivalent way by the Po´lya’s
urn model [21, Chap. 4]: initially, the urn has one ball for
each color C j; at each uniform drawing of a single ball, the
ball is returned together with  = δ − 2 additional balls of the
same color; after n − 1 draws, X j is the number of times that
the balls of color C j are drawn.
Therefore, in the rumor spreading process, if we assume s∗
to be the rumor source with δ neighbors v1, . . . , vδ and observe
n infected nodes Gn with X j nodes in each subtree T s
∗
v j (1 ≤
j ≤ δ), then from (22), the joint distribution of {X j, 1 ≤ j ≤ δ}
is given by
PG
 δ⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
 = (n − 1)!x1!x2! · · · xδ!
∏δ
j=1 1(1 + ) · · · (1 + (x j − 1))
δ(δ + ) · · · (δ + (n − 2)) ,
(27)
where
∑δ
j=1 x j = n − 1.
Besides, the marginal distribution of X1 is
PG (X1 = x1) =
(
n − 1
x1
)∏2
j=1 b
′
j(b
′
j + ) · · · (b′j + (x′j − 1))
δ(δ + ) · · · (δ + (n − 2)) ,
(28)
where b′1 = 1, b
′
2 = δ − 1, x′1 = x1 and x′2 = n − x1 − 1.
We are also interested in the limiting marginal distribution
of the ratio X1/n as n→ ∞. From (26), we have
lim
n→∞PG
(X1
n
≤ x
)
=
Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
∫ x
0
yα−1(1 − y)β−1dy = Ix(α, β),
(29)
where α = 1/(δ − 2), β = (δ − 1)/(δ − 2). In other words, we
have
PG
(X1
n
≤ x
)
= Ix(α, β) + ξ(n, δ), (30)
where limn→∞ ξ(n, δ) = 0 for any given δ.
(3) Markov concatenation of the Po´lya’s urn model
Next, we focus on the case of two suspects. Notably, in
Theorem 4, we use the Markov concatenation of the Po´lya’s
urn model to derive the probability distribution of the infection
observed in the rumor spreading process, focusing on the
nodes along the path between two suspects s1 and s2.
8Assume s1 to be the rumor source s∗, and let P = {v0 =
s1, v1, · · · , vd = s2} be the shortest path from s1 to s2; e.g., see
Fig. 4. Let a random variable Zh (1 ≤ h ≤ d) be the number
of nodes in subtree T s
∗
vh rooted at node vh with node s
∗ as the
source in Gn. It is clear that Zh ≥ Zh+1 + 1 if Zh > 0 for all
1 ≤ h ≤ d−1. In the proof of Theorem 4, we focus on the error
detection probability Pe(n) = 1−Pc(n). Therefore, without loss
of generality, we assume Zh > 0 for all 1 ≤ h ≤ d. Here, we can
also construct the random variables Zh (1 ≤ h ≤ d) equivalently
with the concatenation use of the Po´lya’s urn model.
For random variable Z1, we construct it using the Po´lya’s urn
model as follows: initially, the urn has b11 = 1 black ball and
b11 = δ−1 white balls; at each uniform drawing of a single ball,
the ball is returned together with  = δ − 2 additional balls of
the same color; after n−1 draws, the number Z1 is the number
of times that balls of black color are drawn. Therefore, from
(22), the distribution of Z1 is
PG [Z1 = z1] =
(
n − 1
z1
)∏2
j=1 b
1
j (b
1
j + ) · · · (b1j + (x1j − 1))
b1(b1 + ) · · · (b1 + (n − 1)) ,
(31)
where b1 = δ, x11 = z1 and x
1
2 = n − z1 − 1.
For random variable Zh (2 ≤ h ≤ d) conditioned on Zh−1 =
zh−1, we construct it using the Po´lya’s urn model as follows:
initially, the urn has bhb = 1 black ball and b
h
w = δ − 2 white
balls; at each uniform drawing of a single ball, the ball is
returned together with  = δ − 2 additional balls of the same
color; after zh−1 − 1 draws, the number Zh is the number of
times that balls of black color are drawn. Again, from (22),
the distribution of Zh is
PG [Zh = zh|Zh−1 = zh−1] =
(
zh−1 − 1
zh
)∏2
j=1 b
h
j · · · (bhj + (xhj − 1))
bh · · · (bh + (zh−1 − 2)) ,
(32)
where bh = δ − 1, xh1 = zh and xh2 = zh−1 − zh − 1.
Since Zh only depends on Zh−1 for all 2 ≤ h ≤ d,
thus Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zd form a Markov chain. Therefore, the joint
distribution of {Zh, 1 ≤ h ≤ d} is
PG
 d⋂
h=1
(Zh = zh)
 = PG [Z1 = z1] d∏
h=2
PG [Zh = zh|Zh−1 = zh−1] . (33)
C. Proof of Theorem 2: Suspecting all Nodes
In the case of S = V , we only need to consider an arbitrary
node s∗ ∈ G as the rumor source by symmetry. For a source
s∗ with m (m ≤ δ) neighbors Nl(s∗) = {v1, . . . , vm} ⊂ S , let a
random variable X j be the number of nodes in each subtree
T s
∗
v j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) of Gn. Then, we have the following lemma for
the argument of Theorem 2 (m = δ) and Theorem 3 (m ≤ δ);
see its proof in Appendix-A.
Lemma 6. To correctly identify source s∗ with m neighboring
suspect nodes as the estimate sˆ, we have
p1 := Pc
(
sˆ = s∗
∣∣∣∣∣ max{x j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m} < n/2) = 1,
p1/2 := Pc
(
sˆ = s∗
∣∣∣∣∣ max{x j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m} = n/2) = 12 ,
p0 := Pc
(
sˆ = s∗
∣∣∣∣∣ max{x j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m} > n/2) = 0.
(34)
Remark 6: Lemma 6 is deduced from Proposition 1. In
order to prove Theorem 2 (and Theorem 3), we should find
the conditions, under which s∗ is the local rumor center w.r.t.
Nl(s∗) of Gn, such that the estimator (3) can correctly identify
s∗ as the source.
Since S = V , the source s∗ has m = δ neighboring suspect
nodes. Using Lemma 6, we can write Pc(n) as
Pc(n) = p1/2 ·
∑
max{x j,1≤ j≤δ}=n/2
PG
 δ⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)

+p1 ·
∑
max{x j,1≤ j≤δ}<n/2
PG
 δ⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
 , (35)
where PG
[⋂δ
j=1(X j = x j)
]
is given by (27).
In the following, we will establish the argument of Theorem
2 for three special cases when the node degree δ = 2, δ = 3
and δ > 3, respectively.
(1) Detection probability when δ = 2
Proof of Theorem 2-i. When δ = 2, the distribution in (27)
can be written as
PG
 2⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
 = (n − 1)!x1!x2! 12n−1 . (36)
From (35), the correct detection probability is
Pc(n) =
1
2
∑
max{x1,x2}=n/2
PG
 2⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)

+
∑
max{x1,x2}<n/2
PG
 2⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
 ,
=
1
2n−1
(
n − 1
b(n − 1)/2c
)
. (37)
In the above, the detailed deduction is in Appendix-B.
As n→ ∞, by the Stirling’s formula, we have
Pc(n) ≈ 12n ·
n!
[(n/2)!]2
≈ 1
2n
·
√
2pin ·
(
n
e
)n[√
pin ·
(
n
2e
)n/2]2
=
√
2
pin
= O
(
1√
n
)
. (38)

(2) Detection probability when δ = 3
Proof of Theorem 2-ii. When δ = 3, the distribution in (27)
can be written as
PG
 3⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
 = 2n(n + 1) . (39)
9From (35), the correct detection probability is
Pc(n) =
1
2
∑
max{x j,1≤ j≤3}=n/2
PG
 3⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)

+
∑
max{x j,1≤ j≤3}<n/2
PG
 3⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)

=
1
4
+
3
4
1
2bn/2c + 1 . (40)
In the above, the detailed deduction is in Appendix-C. 
(3) Detection probability when δ > 3
When n is finite, we can numerically compute the exact
detection probability using Algorithm 1 in Section IV. When
n → ∞, we can obtain the asymptotic correct detection
probability similarly to those in [16].
Before the argument of Theorem 2-iii, we present the
following lemma, which will be also used in the argument
of Theorem 3-iii; see its proof in Appendix-D. For a source
s∗ with m (m ≤ δ) neighbors Nl(s∗) = {v1, . . . , vm} in S , let a
random variable X j be the number of nodes in each subtree
T s
∗
v j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) of Gn.
Lemma 7. Define E j = {X j < n/2} and F j = {X j ≤ n/2},
1 ≤ j ≤ m. To correctly identify source s∗ with m neighboring
suspect nodes, we have Pc(n|s∗) ≥ 1 − mPG(Ec1)Pc(n|s∗) ≤ 1 − mPG(Fc1) (41)
where PG(Ec1) and PG(F
c
1) are the probabilities that the
complements of events E1 and F1 occur, respectively.
Remark 7: Lemma 7 is deduced from Proposition 1, and is a
generalization of the statement claimed in [16, Section 4.1.2].
In order to prove Theorem 2-iii (and Theorem 3-iii), we should
show that the lower and upper bounds asymptotically coincide.
Proof of Theorem 2-iii. Since E1 = {X1 < n/2} and F1 =
{X1 ≤ n/2}, i.e., E1 = {X1/n < 1/2} and F1 = {X1/n ≤ 1/2},
from (29), we have
lim
n→∞PG(E1) = limn→∞PG(F1)
=
∫ 1/2
y=0
Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
yα−1(1 − y)β−1dy
= I1/2
(
1
δ − 2 ,
δ − 1
δ − 2
)
. (42)
In other words, from (30), we have
PG(E1) = PG(F1) = I1/2
(
1
δ − 2 ,
δ − 1
δ − 2
)
+ ξ(n, δ), (43)
where limn→∞ ξ(n, δ) = 0.
Since S = V , the source s∗ has m = δ neighboring suspect
nodes. Using Lemma 7, the asymptotic correct detection
probability is
lim
n→∞Pc(n) = 1 − δ
(
1 − I1/2
(
1
δ − 2 ,
δ − 1
δ − 2
))
. (44)
Besides, we see that the asymptotic value limn→∞ Pc(n) >
0.25 if the node degree δ > 3. Furthermore, it approaches
1 − ln2 ≈ 0.307 as δ→ ∞. 
D. Proof of Theorem 3: Connected Suspects
Consider the case where S = {s1, s2, . . . , sk} with cardinality
k forms a connected subgraph of the network G. Here the
restriction of the suspect set poses challenges for analyzing
the problem, and we thus leverage the concept of local rumor
center and exploit the graph structure so as to tackle the
MAP source estimator. By the Bayes’ rule and the a priori
knowledge that Ps(s∗) = 1/k for any s∗ ∈ S , we have
Pc(n) =
k∑
i=1
Ps(si)Pc(n|si) = 1k
∑
s∗∈S
Pc(n|s∗). (45)
We first find the correct detection probability Pc(n|s∗) for
each suspect node s∗ ∈ S . Assume that s∗ ∈ S is the rumor
source and it has m (m ≤ δ) neighbors Nl(s∗) = {v1, . . . , vm} ⊂
S . Let a random variable X j be the number of nodes in each
subtree T s
∗
v j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) of Gn, then by Lemma 6, we should
find the conditions that s∗ is the local rumor center w.r.t. Nl(s∗)
of Gn, and the estimator (3) can correctly identify s∗ as the
source.
Using Lemma 6, we can write Pc(n|s∗) as
Pc(n|s∗) = p1/2 ·
∑
max{x j,1≤ j≤m}=n/2
PG
 δ⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)

+p1 ·
∑
max{x j,1≤ j≤m}<n/2
PG
 δ⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
 ,(46)
where PG
[⋂δ
j=1(X j = x j)
]
is given by (27).
In the following, we will establish the argument of Theorem
3 for three special cases when the node degree δ = 2, δ = 3
and δ > 3, respectively.
(1) Detection probability when δ = 2
Proof of Theorem 3-i. When δ = 2, from (36), we have
PG
 2⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
 = (n − 1)!x1!x2! 12n−1 . (47)
From (46), the correct detection probability for a suspect
node s∗ with m neighbors in the suspect set S is
Pc(n|s∗) = 12
∑
max{x j,1≤ j≤m}=n/2
PG
 2⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)

+
∑
max{x j,1≤ j≤m}<n/2
PG
 2⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)

=

1
2
+
1
2n
(
n − 1
b(n − 1)/2c
)
,m = 1;
1
2n−1
(
n − 1
b(n − 1)/2c
)
,m = 2.
(48)
In the above, the detailed deduction is in Appendix-E.
For a suspect set S with cardinality k that forms a connected
subgraph of a linear network G, we know that only the two
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suspect nodes at the endpoints of the sub-linear network have
one neighboring suspect node, and all the other suspect nodes
have two neighboring suspect nodes. Therefore, from (45), we
have
Pc(n) =
1
k
[
1 +
k − 1
2n−1
(
n − 1
b(n − 1)/2c
)]
. (49)
As n→ ∞, by the Stirling’s formula, we have
Pc(n) =
1
k
+
k − 1
k
O
(
1√
n
)
=
1
k
+ O
(
1√
n
)
. (50)

(2) Detection probability when δ = 3
Proof of Theorem 3-ii. When δ = 3, from (39), we have
PG
 3⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
 = 2n(n + 1) . (51)
From (46), the correct detection probability for a suspect
node s∗ with m neighbors in the suspect set S is
Pc(n|s∗) = 12
∑
max{x j,1≤ j≤m}=n/2
PG
 3⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)

+
∑
max{x j,1≤ j≤m}<n/2
PG
 3⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)

=

3
4
+
1
4
1
2bn/2c + 1 , m = 1;
1
2
+
1
2
1
2bn/2c + 1 , m = 2;
1
4
+
3
4
1
2bn/2c + 1 , m = 3.
(52)
In the above, the detailed deduction is in Appendix-F.
For a suspect set S with cardinality k that forms a connected
subgraph of a regular tree G with node degree δ = 3, for
each suspect node s∗ ∈ S , we first find the number of
its neighboring suspect nodes. Note that given s∗ with m
neighboring suspect nodes, Pc(n|s∗) is one subtracted by a
same factor, 1/4 − 1/(8bn/2c + 4), m times, each of which
accounting for one neighboring suspect node of s∗ connected
by an edge. Since there are k−1 edges connecting the k suspect
nodes in S , each edge will account for a reduction of the factor
twice. Therefore, from (45), we have
Pc(n) = 1 − 1k ·
[
2(k − 1) ·
(
1
4
− 1
8bn/2c + 4
)]
=
k + 1
2k
+
k − 1
k
1
4bn/2c + 2 . (53)

(3) Detection probability when δ > 3
When n is finite, we can numerically compute the exact
detection probability using Algorithm 2 in Section IV. When
n → ∞, we can obtain the asymptotic correct detection
probability using Lemma 7 and an insightful analysis into the
graph structure.
Proof of Theorem 3-iii. From (43), we have
PG(E1) = PG(F1) = I1/2
(
1
δ − 2 ,
δ − 1
δ − 2
)
+ ξ(n, δ), (54)
where limn→∞ ξ(n, δ) = 0.
Using Lemma 7, the correct detection probability for a
suspect node s∗ with m neighbors in the suspect set S is
Pc(n|s∗) = 1 − m
(
1 − I1/2
(
1
δ − 2 ,
δ − 1
δ − 2
)
− ξ(n, δ)
)
. (55)
Note that the residual term ξ(n, δ) is identical2 for all m
neighboring suspect nodes of s∗.
For a suspect set S with cardinality k that forms a connected
subgraph of a regular tree G with node degree δ > 3, for each
suspect node s∗ ∈ S , we first find the number of its neighboring
suspect nodes. Note that, Pc(n|s∗) is one subtracted by a
common factor m times, each of which accounting for one
neighboring suspect node of s∗ connected by an edge. Since
there are k − 1 edges connecting the k suspect nodes in S ,
each edge will account for a reduction of the factor twice.
Therefore, from (45), we have
Pc(n) = 1 − 1k ·
[
2(k − 1) ·
(
1 − I1/2
(
1
δ − 2 ,
δ − 1
δ − 2
)
− ξ(n)
)]
= 1 − 2(k − 1)
k
+
2(k − 1)
k
I1/2
(
1
δ − 2 ,
δ − 1
δ − 2
)
+
2(k − 1)
k
ξ(n, δ). (56)
From Fig. 6, we see that I1/2
(
1
δ−2 ,
δ−1
δ−2
)
> 0.75 as the node
degree δ > 3. Therefore, we have
Pc(n) >
k + 1
2k
, (57)
for any sufficiently large n and δ > 3.
Besides, since 2(k− 1)/k = 2 as k → ∞, thus from (56), we
have
lim
n→∞Pc(n) = 2I1/2
(
1
δ − 2 ,
δ − 1
δ − 2
)
− 1. (58)
Furthermore, since I1/2 (0, 1) = 1 (setting δ → ∞), we thus
have
lim
δ→∞ limn→∞Pc(n)→ 1. (59)
Importantly, note that the growth of δ does not need to depend
on the growth of n.

E. Proof of Theorem 4: Two Suspects
In the case where S = {s1, s2} contains only two suspect
nodes, let d be the shortest path distance between s1 and s2
on G. We assume s1 to be the rumor source s∗ by symmetry, let
P = {v0 = s1, v1, · · · , vd = s2} be the shortest path from s1 to
s2, and define a random variable Zh to be the number of nodes
in the subtree T s
∗
vh (1 ≤ h ≤ d). It is clear that Zh ≥ Zh+1 + 1 if
Zh > 0 for all 1 ≤ h ≤ d − 1.
In the following, we focus on the error detection probability,
i.e., Pe(n) = 1 − Pc(n). As a result, we assume Zh > 0 for all
2Due to the following Lemma 9, all events Ecj = {X j ≥ n/2}, 1 ≤ j ≤ m are
disjoint and symmetric, hence so are Fcj = {X j > n/2}, 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
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1 ≤ h ≤ d. Since there are only two suspect nodes in S , Pe(n)
can be written as
Pe(n) =
1
2
·
∑
R(s∗,Gn)=R(s2,Gn)
PG
 d⋂
h=1
(Zh = zh)

+
∑
R(s∗,Gn)<R(s2,Gn)
PG
 d⋂
h=1
(Zh = zh)
 , (60)
where PG
[⋂d
h=1(Zh = zh)
]
is given by (33).
When n is finite, we can numerically compute the exact
detection probability using Algorithm 3 in Section IV. In the
following, we will establish the argument of Theorem 4.
(1) Detection probability when δ = 2
Proof of Theorem 4-i. From (4), we have R(s∗,Gn) =
(
n−1
z1
)
and R(s2,Gn) =
(
n−1
z1−d
)
. If R(s∗,Gn) ≤ R(s2,Gn), then z1 ≥
(n+d+1)/2. Note that we only need to consider the distribution
of Z1. When δ = 2, the distribution in (31) can be written as
PG [Z1 = z1] =
(n − 1)!
z1!(n − z1 − 1)!
1
2n−1
. (61)
From (60), the error detection probability is
Pe(n) =
1
2
∑
z1=(n+d+1)/2
PG [Z1 = z1] +
∑
z1>(n+d+1)/2
PG [Z1 = z1] ,
=

1
2
− 1
2n
(n+d+1)/2∑
z1=(n−d−1)/2
(
n − 1
z1
)
, (n − d) is odd;
1
2
− 1
2n
(n+d−2)/2∑
z1=(n−d)/2
(
n − 1
z1
)
, (n − d) is even.
(62)
In the above, the detailed deduction is in Appendix-G. 
(2) Detection probability when δ = 3
Proof of Theorem 4-ii. First of all, consider the case when d =
1. From (52), the error detection probability is
Pe(n) = 1 − Pc(n)
=
1
4
− 1
4
1
2bn/2c + 1 . (63)
Now, consider the case when d = 2. The distribution in (33)
can be written as
PG
 2⋂
h=1
(Zh = zh)
 = 2(n − z1)n(n + 1)z1 . (64)
From (7), we have R(s2,Gn) = R(s∗,Gn) z1n−z1
z2
n−z2 . If
R(s∗,Gn) ≤ R(s2,Gn), then z1 + z2 ≥ n. Using (60) and letting
n→ ∞, the error detection probability is
Pe(n) =
1
2
∑
z1+z2=n
PG
 2⋂
h=1
(Zh = zh)
 + ∑
z1+z2>n
PG
 2⋂
h=1
(Zh = zh)

≈ 0.114. (65)
In the above, the detailed deduction is in Appendix-H. 
(3) Detection probability when δ > 3
Proof of Theorem 4-iii. Consider the case when d = 1. From
(55), the error detection probability is
Pe(n) = 1 − Pc(n)
= 1 − I1/2
(
1
δ − 2 ,
δ − 1
δ − 2
)
. (66)
as n→ ∞.
Furthermore, since I1/2 (0, 1) = 1 (setting δ → ∞), we thus
have
lim
δ→∞ limn→∞Pe(n) = 0. (67)

(4) Increasing detection probability with distance
Proof of Theorem 4-iv. Equivalently, we prove that Pe(n) de-
creases with d. Without loss of generality, we assume Zh > 0
for all 1 ≤ h ≤ d. The proof will be completed by showing
that if R(vd,Gn) ≥ R(s∗,Gn) then R(vd−1,Gn) > R(s∗,Gn) for
all d ≥ 2, which is to be verified by contradiction to the
assumption R(vd,Gn) ≥ R(s∗,Gn).
Suppose R(vd−1,Gn) ≤ R(s∗,Gn), then Zd−1 ≤ n/2. Other-
wise, Zd−1 > n/2 and thus Zh > n/2 for all 1 ≤ h ≤ d − 1;
namely, Zh/(n − Zh) > 1 for all 1 ≤ h ≤ d − 1. Repeatedly
using (7), we have
R(vd−1,Gn) = R(s∗,Gn)
Z1
n − Z1
Z2
n − Z2 · · ·
Zd−1
n − Zd−1 , (68)
which leads to the contradiction that R(vd−1,Gn) > R(s∗,Gn).
As a result, we have Zd−1 ≤ n/2.
As Zd−1 ≤ n/2, then Zd < n/2 and thus Zd/(n − Zd) < 1. As
a result, we have
R(vd,Gn) = R(vd−1,Gn)
Zd
n − Zd < R(vd−1,Gn) ≤ R(s
∗,Gn),
(69)
which is in contradiction to the assumption of R(vd,Gn) ≥
R(s∗,Gn). 
F. Proof of Theorem 5: Multiple Suspects
Consider the case where S = {s1, s2, . . . , sk} with cardinality
k forms a general subgraph of the network G. From (45), we
have
Pc(n) =
k∑
i=1
Ps(si)Pc(n|si) = 1k
∑
s∗∈S
Pc(n|s∗). (70)
We first find the correct detection probability Pc(n|s∗) for
each suspect node s∗ ∈ S . Assume that s∗ ∈ S is the rumor
source and it has m (m ≤ δ) neighbors Nl(s∗) = {v1, . . . , vm},
subject to that each subtree T s
∗
v j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) of G contains
at least one suspect node in S . In the following, we call the
nodes in Nl(s∗) as suspect neighbors. Let a random variable
X j be the number of nodes in each subtree T s
∗
v j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
of Gn, then we have the following lemma; for its proof see
Appendix-I.
Lemma 8. To correctly identify source s∗ with m suspect
neighbors, we have
Pc(n|s∗) ≥ 1 − Pc(n|s∗, conn), (71)
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where Pc(n|s∗, conn) is the correct detection probability for
s∗ when all the m suspect neighbors are neighboring suspect
nodes of s∗.
Remark 8: Lemma 8 is deduced from Proposition 1. In order
to prove Theorem 5, we shall find the lower bound of Pc(n|s∗)
in the following.
When the k suspect nodes in S form a connected subgraph
of the network G, we can exactly compute Pc(n) in both
the finite and asymptotic regimes. In the following, we will
establish the argument of Theorem 5.
(1) Detection probability when δ = 2
Proof of Theorem 5-i. We use Lemma 8 and (48) to obtain a
lower bound of the correct detection probability for a suspect
node s∗ with m suspect neighbors:
Pc(n|s∗) ≥

1
2
+
1
2n
(
n − 1
b(n − 1)/2c
)
,m = 1;
1
2n−1
(
n − 1
b(n − 1)/2c
)
,m = 2.
(72)
For a suspect set S with cardinality k that forms a general
subgraph of a linear network G, we know that only the two
suspect nodes at the endpoints of the sub-linear network have
one suspect neighbor and all other suspect nodes have two
suspect neighbors. Therefore, from (70), we have
Pc(n) ≥ 1k
[
1 +
k − 1
2n−1
(
n − 1
b(n − 1)/2c
)]
. (73)
As n→ ∞, by the Stirling’s formula, we have
Pc(n) ≥ 1k +
k − 1
k
O
(
1√
n
)
=
1
k
+ O
(
1√
n
)
. (74)

(2) Detection probability when δ = 3
Proof of Theorem 5-ii. We use Lemma 8 and (52) to obtain a
lower bound of the correct detection probability for a suspect
node s∗ with m suspect neighbors as
Pc(n|s∗) ≥

3
4
+
1
4
1
2bn/2c + 1 ,m = 1;
1
2
+
1
2
1
2bn/2c + 1 ,m = 2;
1
4
+
3
4
1
2bn/2c + 1 ,m = 3.
(75)
For a suspect set S with cardinality k that forms a general
subgraph of a regular tree G with node degree δ = 3, for each
suspect node s∗ ∈ S , we first find the number of its suspect
neighbors. Note that given s∗ with m suspect neighbors, the
lower bound of Pc(n|s∗) is one subtracted by a same factor,
1/4 − 1/(8bn/2c + 4), m times, each of which accounting for
one suspect neighbors of s∗ connected by an edge. Since there
are at most 2(k − 1) edges connecting the k suspect nodes in
S and their suspect neighbors, each edge will account for a
reduction of the factor once. Therefore, from (70), we have
Pc(n) ≥ k + 12k +
k − 1
k
1
4bn/2c + 2 . (76)

(3) Detection probability when δ > 3
Proof of Theorem 5-iii. We use Lemma 8 and (55) to obtain a
lower bound of the correct detection probability for a suspect
node s∗ with m suspect neighbors as
Pc(n|s∗) ≥ 1 − m
(
1 − I1/2
(
1
δ − 2 ,
δ − 1
δ − 2
)
− ξ(n, δ)
)
. (77)
For a suspect set S with cardinality k that forms a general
subgraph of a regular tree G with node degree δ > 3, for
each suspect node s∗ ∈ S , we first find the number of its
suspect neighbors. Note that the lower bound of Pc(n|s∗) is
one subtracted by a common factor m times, each of which
accounting for one suspect neighbors of s∗ connected by an
edge. Since there are at most 2(k − 1) edges connecting the
k suspect nodes in S and their suspect neighbors, each edge
will account for a reduction of the factor once. Therefore, from
(70), we have
Pc(n) ≥ 1 − 2(k − 1)k +
2(k − 1)
k
I1/2
(
1
δ − 2 ,
δ − 1
δ − 2
)
+
2(k − 1)
k
ξ(n, δ). (78)
From Fig. 6, we see that I1/2
(
1
δ−2 ,
δ−1
δ−2
)
> 0.75 for δ > 3.
Therefore, we have
Pc(n) >
k + 1
2k
, (79)
for any sufficiently large n and δ > 3.
Besides, since 2(k− 1)/k = 2 as k → ∞, thus from (78), we
have
lim
n→∞Pc(n) ≥ 2I1/2
(
1
δ − 2 ,
δ − 1
δ − 2
)
− 1. (80)
Furthermore, since I1/2 (0, 1) = 1 (setting δ → ∞) we thus
have
lim
δ→∞ limn→∞Pc(n) = 1. (81)
Importantly, note that the growth of δ does not need to depend
on the growth of n.

(4) The worst-case detection probability
Before the argument of Theorem 5-iv, we present the
following lemma, which will be also used in the design of
the numerical algorithms in Section IV; for its proof see
Appendix-J. For a source s∗ with m (m ≤ δ) neighbors
Nl(s∗) = {v1, . . . , vm} in S , let a random variable X j be the
number of nodes in each subtree T s
∗
v j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) of Gn.
Lemma 9. To correctly identify source s∗ with m neighboring
suspect nodes as the estimate sˆ, we have
Pc(n|s∗) = 1−m
0.5PG (X1 = n2
)
+
∑
x1>n/2
PG (X1 = x1)
 , (82)
where PG (X1 = x1) is given by (28).
Remark 9: Lemma 9 is deduced from Proposition 1. In fact,
we can use Lemma 9 to deduce the exact detection probability
Pc(n) in the finite regime for Theorems 2 and 3, instead of
using Lemma 6.
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Proof of Theorem 5-iv. First, consider the case when the k
suspect nodes are connected, and we use Lemma 9 to derive
the minimum of Pc(n).
For a suspect set S with cardinality k that forms a connected
subgraph of a regular tree G with node degree δ ≥ 2, for each
suspect node s∗ ∈ S , we first find the number of its neighboring
suspect nodes. Note that Pc(n|s∗) in (82) is one subtracted by
a common factor m times, each of which accounting for one
neighboring suspect node of s∗ connected by an edge. Since
there are k − 1 edges connecting the k suspect nodes in S ,
each edge will account for a reduction of the factor twice.
Therefore, from (70), we have
Pc(n) = 1 − 2(k − 1)k
0.5PG (X1 = n2
)
+
∑
x1>n/2
PG (X1 = x1)
 .
(83)
Next, consider the case when the k suspect nodes form a
general subgraph of G. From Lemmas 8 and 9, a lower bound
of the correct detection probability for a suspect node s∗ with
m suspect neighbors is
Pc(n|s∗) ≥ 1−m
0.5PG (X1 = n2
)
+
∑
x1>n/2
PG (X1 = x1)
 . (84)
For a suspect set S with cardinality k that forms a general
subgraph of a regular tree G with node degree δ ≥ 2, for
each suspect node s∗ ∈ S , we first find the number of its
suspect neighbors. Note that the lower bound of Pc(n|s∗) is
one subtracted by a common factor m times, each of which
accounting for one suspect neighbors of s∗ connected by an
edge. Since there are at most 2(k − 1) edges connecting the
k suspect nodes in S and their suspect neighbors, each edge
will account for a reduction of the factor once. Therefore, from
(70), we have
Pc(n) ≥ 1 − 2(k − 1)k
0.5PG (X1 = n2
)
+
∑
x1>n/2
PG (X1 = x1)
 , (85)
where this lower bound is achievable if and only if the k
suspect nodes are connected. 
IV. Detection Probability on Regular Trees: Numerical
Computation
In this section, we propose algorithms to compute the
exact detection probabilities of the MAP estimator in the
finite regime for regular tree-type networks, based on the
theoretical results established in Section III. We focus on
three representative scenarios: First, the suspect set contains
all the nodes in the network; Second, the suspect set forms
a connected subgraph of the network; Third, the suspect
set contains only two nodes. Their corresponding algorithms
are listed in Table II. We further establish that the correct
detection probability monotonically decreases with the number
of infected nodes and monotonically increases with the node
degree for the former two cases.
TABLE II
Algorithms for Computing the Detection Probability of the MAP Estimator
Suspect characteristics Numerical computation
All nodes are suspects Algorithm 1
Suspects forms a connected subgraph Algorithm 2
Two suspects Algorithm 3
A. Suspecting all Nodes
In this case, S = V , we only need to consider an arbitrary
node s∗ ∈ G as the rumor source by symmetry. For a source
s∗ with δ neighbors Nl(s∗) = {v1, . . . , vδ} ⊂ S , let a random
variable X j be the number of nodes in each subtree T s
∗
v j (1 ≤
j ≤ δ) of Gn. Then, we use Algorithm 1 to compute the exact
detection probability for this case.
When δ = 2 and δ = 3, we use (10) and (11) to compute
Pc(n), respectively. When δ > 3, from Lemma 9, we have
Pc(n) = 1 − δ
0.5PG (X1 = n2
)
+
∑
x1>n/2
PG (X1 = x1)
 . (86)
Based on (86), we have the following corollary; for its proof
see Appendix-K.
Corollary 10. Suppose S = V, i.e., every infected node is a
suspect node, then:
i) Pc(n) monotonically decreases with n;
ii) Pc(n) monotonically increases with δ.
Remark 10: Corollary 10 is complementary to Theorem 2.
The MAP estimator has better detection performance when n is
smaller, i.e., at an earlier stage of the rumor spreading process.
On the other hand, the MAP estimator performs better for a
network with a richer connectivity (higher node degree).
B. Connected Suspects
In this case, S = {s1, s2, . . . , sk} with cardinality k forms a
connected subgraph of the network G. Assume that s∗ ∈ S
is the rumor source and it has m (m ≤ δ) neighbors Nl(s∗) =
{v1, . . . , vm} ⊂ S . Let a random variable X j be the number of
nodes in each subtree T s
∗
v j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) of Gn. Then, we use
Algorithm 2 to compute the exact detection probability for this
case.
Algorithm 1 AllSuspect(δ, n)
Initialize Pc(n) = 0
if δ = 2 then
Compute Pc(n) using (10)
else if δ = 3 then
Compute Pc(n) using (11)
else
tmp = 0.5 · PG (X1 = n/2)
for x1 = bn/2c + 1→ n − 1 do
tmp = tmp + PG (X1 = x1)
end for
Pc(n) = 1 − δ · tmp
end if
Output Pc(n)
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Algorithm 2 ConnSuspect(δ, k, n)
Initialize Pc(n) = 0
if δ = 2 then
Compute Pc(n) using (13)
else if δ = 3 then
Compute Pc(n) using (14)
else
tmp = 0.5 · PG (X1 = n/2)
for x1 = bn/2c + 1→ n − 1 do
tmp = tmp + PG (X1 = x1)
end for
Pc(n) = 1 − 2(k−1)k · tmp
end if
Output Pc(n)
Algorithm 3 TwoSuspect(δ, d, n)
Initialize Pc(n) = 0
if δ = 2 then
Compute Pc(n) by (16)
else
tmp = 0
Enumerate Φ = {Gn | R(s∗,Gn) = R(s2,Gn)}
for each infection Gn ∈ Φ do
tmp = tmp + 0.5 · PG
[⋂d
h=1(Zh = zh)
]
end for
Enumerate Φ = {Gn | R(s∗,Gn) < R(s2,Gn)}
for each infection Gn ∈ Φ do
tmp = tmp + PG
[⋂d
h=1(Zh = zh)
]
end for
Pc(n) = 1 − tmp
end if
Output Pc(n)
When δ = 2 and δ = 3, we use (13) and (14) to compute
Pc(n), respectively. When δ > 3, from Lemma 9 and (83), we
have
Pc(n) = 1 − 2(k − 1)k
0.5PG (X1 = n2
)
+
∑
x1>n/2
PG (X1 = x1)
 .
(87)
Based on (87), we have the following corollary which is
complementary to Theorem 3; its proof is similar to that of
Corollary 10 and hence omitted.
Corollary 11. Suppose that S forms a connected subgraph of
G, then:
i) Pc(n) monotonically decreases with n;
ii) Pc(n) monotonically increases with δ.
C. Two Suspects
In this case, S = {s1, s2} contains only two suspect nodes.
Let d be the shortest path distance between s1 and s2 in G.
We assume s1 to be the rumor source s∗ by symmetry, let
P = {v0 = s1, v1, · · · , vd = s2} be the shortest path from s1 to
s2, and define a random variable Zh to be the number of nodes
in the subtree T s
∗
vh (1 ≤ h ≤ d). Then, we have Algorithm 3 to
compute the exact detection probability for this case.
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Fig. 7. Detection probability when S = V .
When δ = 2, we use (16) to compute Pc(n). When δ ≥ 3,
from (60), we have
Pc(n) = 1 − 12 ·
∑
R(s∗,Gn)=R(s2,Gn)
PG
 d⋂
h=1
(Zh = zh)

−
∑
R(s∗,Gn)<R(s2,Gn)
PG
 d⋂
h=1
(Zh = zh)
 , (88)
where PG
[⋂d
h=1(Zh = zh)
]
is given by (33).
V. Numerical Experiments
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Fig. 8. Detection probability when S forms a connected subgraph of G.
In this section, we carry out simulation experiments to
corroborate and illustrate our analysis. For verifying the
asymptotic results, in each experiment run we let n = 1000
nodes be eventually infected by a rumor source node uniformly
randomly chosen from the suspect set, following the SI model,
and use the estimator (3) to identify this source.
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Fig. 9. Detection probability when S contains two suspect nodes.
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Fig. 10. Detection probability when S forms a connected subgraph of G.
For the first scenario of S = V , it is shown in Fig. 7
that the correct detection probability is increasing with the
node degree δ, from virtually zero when δ = 2 to 0.307 as δ
exceeds 50. In Fig. 8, we consider the scenario where there
are k connected suspect nodes. We observe that the correct
detection probability significantly exceeds 1/k when δ > 2,
and that reliable detection is achieved as δ grows large. In Fig.
9, we consider the scenario where there are two suspect nodes
with a shortest path distance d. We observe that the correct
detection probability significantly exceeds the prior 1/2 when
δ > 2. Furthermore, the detection probability increases as d
increases, and reliable detection is achieved when either δ or
d is sufficiently large.
In addition, to verify that even when k becomes large our
results in Theorem 3 will not degenerate to the case with no
a priori knowledge, we let the suspect set cardinality k range
from 2 to 4000 in the scenario where the k suspect nodes form
a connected subgraph, and let n = 1000 nodes be eventually
infected. From Fig. 10, we observe that the correct detection
probability is always at least 1/2, and accurately coincides
with the theoretical prediction in Theorem 3.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the problem of rooting out
a single rumor source from a set of suspect nodes under
an SI model, focusing on the performance analysis of the
MAP source estimator. In order to handle the presence of the
suspect set, we have developed a key concept of local rumor
center which greatly facilitates the analysis. For regular tree-
type networks, we have developed both finite and asymptotic
detection performance results of the MAP estimator, using the
Po´lya’s urn model in probability theory. We have investigated
four representative scenarios, for each of which developing
analytical results and shedding key insights into the behavior
of the rumor spreading process in large-scale networks. The
introduction of the a priori knowledge of suspect set dramat-
ically improves the detection performance compared with the
case of no a priori knowledge, and substantially enriches the
scope of the rumor source estimation problem.
Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 6
Proof of Lemma 6. If max{x j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m} < n/2, then from
Proposition 1, we know that s∗ is the local rumor center w.r.t.
the sub-neighborhood Nl(s∗) = {v1, . . . , vm} of Gn. Again from
Proposition 1, we have R(u,Gn) < R(s∗,Gn) for all u ∈ T s∗v j and
1 ≤ j ≤ m. Therefore, we can make sure to correctly identify
s∗ as the rumor source.
If max{x j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m} = n/2, then from Proposition
1, we know that s∗ is the local rumor center w.r.t. the
sub-neighborhood Nl(s∗) = {v1, . . . , vm} of Gn. Again from
Proposition 1, there is only a node u ∈ Nl(s∗) such that
R(u,Gn) = R(s∗,Gn), and R(v,Gn) < R(s∗,Gn) for all v ∈
{T s∗v j , 1 ≤ j ≤ m} \ {u}}. Therefore, the probability to correctly
identify s∗ as the rumor source is 1/2.
If max{x j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m} > n/2, then from Proposition
1, we know that s∗ is not the local rumor center w.r.t. the
sub-neighborhood Nl(s∗) = {v1, . . . , vm} of Gn. Therefore, we
cannot identify s∗ as the rumor source. 
B. Proof of (37)
Here, we only present the detailed proof of (37) when n is
even. The case when n is odd can be deduced similarly.
When n is even, we have
Pc(n) =
1
2
∑
max{x1,x2}=n/2
PG
[ 2⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
]
+
∑
max{x1,x2}<n/2
PG
[ 2⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
]
=
1
2
PG
[n − 2
2
,
n
2
]
+
1
2
PG
[n
2
,
n − 2
2
]
,
where we use the short form of PG
[⋂2
j=1(X j = x j)
]
, just as
PG
[
x j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2
]
.
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From (36), we have
Pc(n) =
1
2n
(n − 1)!
((n − 2)/2)!(n/2)! +
1
2n
(n − 1)!
(n/2)!((n − 2)/2)!
=
1
2n−1
(
n − 1
(n − 2)/2
)
.
C. Proof of (40)
Here, we only present the detailed proof of (40) when n is
odd. The case when n is even can be deduced similarly.
When n is odd, we have
Pc(n) =
1
2
∑
max{x j ,1≤ j≤3}=n/2
PG
[ 3⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
]
+
∑
max{x j ,1≤ j≤3}<n/2
PG
[ 3⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
]
= PG
[
0,
n − 1
2
,
n − 1
2
]
+PG
[
1,
n − 1
2
,
n − 3
2
]
+ PG
[
1,
n − 3
2
,
n − 1
2
]
...
+PG
[n − 1
2
,
n − 1
2
, 0
]
+ · · · + PG
[n − 1
2
, 0,
n − 1
2
]
,
where we use the short form of PG
[⋂3
j=1(X j = x j)
]
, just as
PG
[
x j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3
]
.
From (39), we have
Pc(n) =
2
n(n + 1)
x=(n−1)/2∑
x=0
(x + 1) =
1
4
+
3
4n
.
D. Proof of Lemma 7
Proof of Lemma 7. Since the source s∗ has m (1 ≤ m ≤ δ)
neighbors in the suspect set S , from Proposition 1 and Lemma
6, we have
Pc(n|s∗) ≥ PG
[ m⋂
j=1
E j
]
= 1 − PG
[ m⋃
j=1
Ecj
]
(a)≥ 1 −
m∑
j=1
PG
[
Ecj
]
(b)
= 1 − mPG
[
Ec1
]
.
Above, (a) is by the union bound over events Ec1, . . . , E
c
m, and
(b) by symmetry.
Again using Proposition 1 and Lemma 6, we have
Pc(n|s∗) ≤ PG
[ m⋂
i=1
Fi
]
= 1 − PG
[ m⋃
i=1
Fci
]
(a)
= 1 −
m∑
i=1
PG
[
Fci
]
(b)
= 1 − mPG
[
Fc1
]
.
Above, (a) follows from the fact that events Fc1, . . . , F
c
m are
disjoint since there is at most a subtree such that the number
of nodes in it is more than n/2, and (b) from symmetry. 
E. Proof of (48)
Here, we only present the detailed proof of (48) when m = 1
with even n. The case when m = 1 with odd n can be deduced
similarly, and the case when m = 2 is the same as that in
Appendix-B.
For m = 1 and n is even, we have
Pc(n|s∗) = 12
∑
x1=n/2
PG
[ 2⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
]
+
∑
x1<n/2
PG
[ 2⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
]
=
1
2
PG
[n
2
,
n − 2
2
]
+ PG
[n − 2
2
,
n
2
]
+ · · · + PG
[
0, n − 1
]
,
where we use the short form of PG
[⋂2
j=1(X j = x j)
]
, just as
PG
[
x j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2
]
.
From (47), we have
Pc(n|s∗) = 12n
(
n − 1
n/2
)
+
1
2n−1
(n−2)/2∑
x=0
(
n − 1
x
)
=
1
2
+
1
2n
(
n − 1
(n − 2)/2
)
.
F. Proof of (52)
Here, we only present the detailed proof of (52) when m = 2
with odd n. The case when m = 3 is the same as that in
Appendix-C, and the other cases can be deduced similarly.
For m = 2 and n is odd, we have
Pc(n|s∗) = 12
∑
max{x j ,1≤ j≤2}=n/2
PG
[ 3⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
]
+
∑
max{x j ,1≤ j≤2}<n/2
PG
[ 3⋂
j=1
(X j = x j)
]
= PG
[
0,
n − 1
2
,
n − 1
2
]
+ · · · + PG
[
0, 0, n − 1
]
+PG
[
1,
n − 1
2
,
n − 3
2
]
+ · · · + PG
[
1, 0, n − 2
]
...
+PG
[n − 1
2
,
n − 1
2
, 0
]
+ · · · + PG
[n − 1
2
, 0,
n − 1
2
]
,
where we use the short form of PG
[⋂3
j=1(X j = x j)
]
, just as
PG
[
x j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3
]
.
From (51), we have
Pc(n|s∗) = 2n(n + 1)
x=(n−1)/2∑
x=0
n + 1
2
=
1
2
+
1
2n
.
G. Proof of (62)
Here, we only present the detailed proof of (62) when n
is odd with even d. The other three cases can be deduced
similarly.
Since z1 ≥ (n + d + 1)/2 if and only if R(s∗,Gn) ≤ R(s2,Gn),
thus from (61), we have
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Pe(n) =
1
2
∑
z1=(n+d+1)/2
PG [Z1 = z1] +
∑
z1>(n+d+1)/2
PG [Z1 = z1]
=
1
2n
(
n − 1
(n + d + 1)/2
)
+
1
2n−1
n−1∑
z1=(n+d+3)/2
(
n − 1
z1
)
=
1
2
− 1
2n
(n+d+1)/2∑
z1=(n−d−1)/2
(
n − 1
z1
)
.
H. Proof of (65)
Here, we only present the detailed proof of (65) when n is even.
The case when n is odd can be deduced similarly.
Since z1 + z2 ≥ n if and only if R(s∗,Gn) ≤ R(s2,Gn). Besides,
z1 ≥ z2 + 1, thus z1 ≥ (n + 1)/2. Therefore, from (64), we have
Pe(n) =
1
2
∑
z1+z2=n
PG
 2⋂
h=1
(Zh = zh)
 + ∑
z1+z2>n
PG
 2⋂
h=1
(Zh = zh)

=
1
2
PG
[n
2
+ 1,
n
2
− 1
]
+ · · · + 1
2
PG
[
n − 1, 1
]
+ PG
[n
2
+ 1,
n
2
]
+ PG
[n
2
+ 2,
n
2
− 1
]
+ · · · + PG
[n
2
+ 2,
n
2
+ 1
]
...
+ PG
[
n − 1, 2
]
+ · · · + PG
[
n − 1, n − 2
]
=
2
n(n + 1)
n/2 − 1
n/2 + 1
(
1
2
+ 1
)
+
2
n(n + 1)
n/2 − 2
n/2 + 2
(
1
2
+ 3
)
+ · · · + 2
n(n + 1)
n/2 − (n − 2)/2
n/2 + (n − 2)/2
(
1
2
+ n − 3
)
,
where we use the short form of PG
[⋂3
h=1(Zh = zh)
]
, just as
PG
[
zh, 1 ≤ h ≤ 3
]
. As n→ ∞, we have
lim
n→∞Pe(n) ≈ 0.114.
I. Proof of Lemma 8
Proof of Lemma 8. Consider the case when the rumor source
s∗ has m (1 ≤ m ≤ δ) suspect neighbors Nl(s∗) = {v1, . . . , vm}.
From Proposition 1, if s∗ is the local rumor center w.r.t. Nl(s∗)
of Gn, then R(s∗,Gn) ≥ R(u,Gn) for all u ∈ S ⋂ Nl(s∗), and
R(s∗,Gn) > R(u′,Gn) for all u ∈ S \ {Nl(s∗) ⋃ s∗}.
When all the m suspect neighbors of s∗ are neighboring
suspect nodes of s∗, from Proposition 1, the MAP estimator
can correctly identify s∗ as the estimate sˆ if and only if s∗ is
the local rumor center. However, in general cases, the MAP
estimator can correctly identify s∗ as the estimate sˆ even if s∗
is not a local rumor center. 
J. Proof of Lemma 9
Proof of Lemma 9. Define E=j = {X j = n/2} and E>j = {X j >
n/2}, 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Note that {E=j , E>j , 1 ≤ j ≤ m} are all disjoint.
For the error detection probability Pe(n|s∗) = 1−Pc(n|s∗), from
Proposition 1 and Lemma 6, we have
Pe(n|s∗) = 0.5PG
[ m⋃
j=1
E=j
]
+ PG
[ m⋃
j=1
E>j
]
= m
0.5PG (X1 = n2
)
+
∑
x1>n/2
PG (X1 = x1)
 ,
where the last equality follows from symmetry. 
K. Proof of Corollary 10
For Corollary 10-i with fixed node degree δ ≥ 2, from
(86), we should prove that Pe1(n) = (1 − Pc(n)) /δ =
0.5PG
(
X1 = n2
)
+
∑
x1>n/2 PG (X1 = x1) increases with n (n ≥ 2).
Note that Pe1(n) is the error detection probability of the MAP
estimator to identify the neighboring suspect node s∗1 of the
rumor source s∗ as the estimate sˆ. In the following, we deduce
the relation of Pe1(n) between n = 2i and n = 2i + 1, and that
between n = 2i + 1 and n = 2i + 2, for all i ∈ N+.
Proof of Corollary 10-i. First, consider the relation of Pe1(n)
between n = 2i and n = 2i + 1. From (86), we have
Pe1(n = 2i + 1) =
2i∑
x1=i+1
PG (X1 = x1|n = 2i + 1) ,
and
Pe1(n = 2i) = 0.5PG (X1 = i|n = 2i) +
2i−1∑
x1=i+1
PG (X1 = x1|n = 2i) .
where PG (X1 = x1|n) is given by (28) conditioned on n.
When x1 = 2i, from (28), we have
PG (X1 = 2i|n = 2i + 1)
=
(
2i
2i
)∏2
j=1 b j(b j + ) · · · (b j + (x j − 1))
δ(δ + ) · · · (δ + (2i − 1))
=
1 + (2i − 1)(δ − 2)
δ + (2i − 1)(δ − 2)
(
2i − 1
2i − 1
)∏2
j=1 b j(b j + ) · · · (b j + (x j − 1))
δ(δ + ) · · · (δ + (2i − 2))
=
1 + (2i − 1)(δ − 2)
2 + 2i(δ − 2) PG (X1 = 2i − 1|n = 2i) ,
where b1 = 1, b2 = δ − 1,  = δ − 2 and x2 = n − x1 − 1.
When x1 = i + 1, . . . , 2i − 1, from (28), we have
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PG (X1 = x + 1|n = 2i + 1)
=
(
2i
x + 1
)∏2
j=1 b j(b j + ) · · · (b j + (x j − 1))
δ(δ + ) · · · (δ + (2i − 1))
=
2i
x + 1
1 + x(δ − 2)
δ + (2i − 1)(δ − 2)
(
2i − 1
x
)∏2
j=1 b j · · · (b j + (x j − 1))
δ · · · (δ + (2i − 2))
=
2i
x + 1
1 + x(δ − 2)
δ + (2i − 1)(δ − 2) PG (X1 = x|n = 2i)
=
1 + x(δ − 2)
δ + (2i − 1)(δ − 2) PG (X1 = x|n = 2i)
+
2i − x − 1
x + 1
1 + x(δ − 2)
δ + (2i − 1)(δ − 2) PG (X1 = x|n = 2i)
=
1 + x(δ − 2)
δ + (2i − 1)(δ − 2) PG (X1 = x|n = 2i)
+
δ − 1 + (2i − x − 2)(δ − 2)
δ + (2i − 1)(δ − 2)
(
2i − 1
x + 1
)∏2
j=1 b j · · · (b j + (x j − 1))
δ · · · (δ + (2i − 2))
=
1 + x(δ − 2)
2 + 2i(δ − 2) PG (X1 = x|n = 2i)
+
1 + (2i − x − 1)(δ − 2)
2 + 2i(δ − 2) PG (X1 = x + 1|n = 2i) ,
where b1 = 1, b2 = δ − 1,  = δ − 2 and x2 = n − x1 − 1.
Using the above relations and merging the adjacent items,
we have
Pe1(n = 2i + 1) =
2i∑
x1=i+1
PG (X1 = x1|n = 2i + 1)
=
1 + (2i − 1)(δ − 2)
2 + 2i(δ − 2) PG (X1 = 2i − 1|n = 2i)
+
1 + 1(δ − 2)
2 + 2i(δ − 2)PG (X1 = 2i − 1|n = 2i)
+
1 + (2i − 2)(δ − 2)
2 + 2i(δ − 2) PG (X1 = 2i − 2|n = 2i)
...
+
1 + i(δ − 2)
2 + 2i(δ − 2)PG (X1 = i|n = 2i)
= 0.5PG (X1 = i|n = 2i) +
2i−1∑
x1=i+1
PG (X1 = x1|n = 2i)
= Pe1(n = 2i).
Now, consider the relation of Pe1(n) between n = 2i + 1 and
n = 2i + 2. From (86), we have
Pe1(n = 2i + 2) = 0.5PG (X1 = i + 1|n = 2i + 2)
+
2i+1∑
x1=i+2
PG (X1 = x1|n = 2i + 2) ,
and
Pe1(n = 2i + 1) =
2i∑
x1=i+1
PG (X1 = x1|n = 2i + 1) .
where PG (X1 = x1|n) is given by (28) conditioned on n.
When x1 = 2i + 1, similarly from (28), we have
PG (X1 = 2i + 1|n = 2i + 2)
=
1 + 2i(δ − 2)
2 + (2i + 1)(δ − 2)PG (X1 = 2i|n = 2i + 1) .
When x1 = i + 1, . . . , 2i, similarly from (28), we have
PG (X1 = x + 1|n = 2i + 2)
=
1 + x(δ − 2)
2 + (2i + 1)(δ − 2)PG (X1 = x|n = 2i + 1)
+
1 + (2i − x)(δ − 2)
2 + (2i + 1)(δ − 2)PG (X1 = x + 1|n = 2i + 1) .
Using the above relations and merging the adjacent items,
we have
Pe1(n = 2i + 2)
= 0.5PG (X1 = i + 1|n = 2i + 1) +
2i+1∑
x1=i+2
PG (X1 = x1|n = 2i + 2)
=
1 + 2i(δ − 2)
2 + (2i + 1)(δ − 2) PG (X1 = 2i|n = 2i + 1)
+
1 + 1(δ − 2)
2 + (2i + 1)(δ − 2) PG (X1 = 2i|n = 2i + 1)
+
1 + (2i − 1)(δ − 2)
2 + (2i + 1)(δ − 2) PG (X1 = 2i − 1|n = 2i + 1)
...
+
1 + (i + 1)(δ − 2)
2 + (2i + 1)(δ − 2) PG (X1 = i + 1|n = 2i + 1)
+0.5
1 + i(δ − 2)
2 + (2i + 1)(δ − 2) PG (X1 = i + 1|n = 2i + 1)
+0.5
1 + i(δ − 2)
2 + (2i + 1)(δ − 2) PG (X1 = i|n = 2i + 1)
=
2i∑
x1=i+1
PG (X1 = x1|n = 2i + 1)
+
1
2i
1 + i(δ − 2)
2 + (2i + 1)(δ − 2) PG (X1 = i + 1|n = 2i + 1)
= Pe1(n = 2i + 1)
+
1
2i
1 + i(δ − 2)
2 + (2i + 1)(δ − 2) PG (X1 = i + 1|n = 2i + 1) .
In summary, we have
Pe1(n = 2i + 1) = Pe1(n = 2i),
and
Pe1(n = 2i + 2) = Pe1(n = 2i + 1)
+
1
2i
1 + i(δ − 2)
2 + (2i + 1)(δ − 2)PG (X1 = i + 1|n = 2i + 1) ,
for all i ∈ N+. Therefore, the proof of Corollary 10-i is
completed. 
For Corollary 10-ii with fixed infection number n ≥
2, from (86), we should prove that δ · Pe1(n) = 1 −
Pc(n) = δ
(
0.5PG
(
X1 = n2
)
+
∑
x1>n/2 PG (X1 = x1)
)
decreases
with δ (δ ≥ 2). In the following, we show that the derivative
of δ · Pe1(n) w.r.t. δ is non-positive using the mathematical
induction.
Proof of Corollary 10-ii. First, consider n = 2, and δ·Pe1(n) =
1/2. Therefore, the derivative of δ · Pe1(n = 2) w.r.t. δ is non-
positive.
Then, suppose that the derivative of δ ·Pe1(n = 2i) w.r.t. δ is
non-positive, where i ∈ N+. Since Pe1(n = 2i+1) = Pe1(n = 2i),
thus the derivative of δ ·Pe1(n = 2i + 1) w.r.t. δ is non-positive.
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Next, we prove that the derivative of δ · Pe1(n = 2i + 2) w.r.t.
δ is non-positive.
Since we have
Pe1(n = 2i + 2) = Pe1(n = 2i + 1)
+
1
2i
1 + i(δ − 2)
2 + (2i + 1)(δ − 2)PG (X1 = i + 1|n = 2i + 1) ,
the proof will be completed if we show that the derivative
of 12i
1+i(δ−2)
2+(2i+1)(δ−2) · δ · PG (X1 = i + 1|n = 2i + 1) w.r.t. δ is non-
positive. In the following, we use the logarithmic function of
1
2i
1+i(δ−2)
2+(2i+1)(δ−2) · δ · PG (X1 = i + 1|n = 2i + 1) for convenience.
Letting g1(δ|i) = log
(
1
2i
1+i(δ−2)
2+(2i+1)(δ−2)
)
, then we have
g′1(δ|i) =
i
1 + i(δ − 2) −
2i + 1
2 + (2i + 1)(δ − 2)
=
−1
(1 + i(δ − 2))(2 + (2i + 1)(δ − 2)) .
Let g2(δ|i) = log (δ · PG (X1 = i + 1|n = 2i + 1)), and we use
the mathematical induction once again so as to prove that the
derivative of g2(δ|i) w.r.t. δ is non-positive for all fixed i.
Considering i = 1, then we have g2(δ|i = 1) = log
(
1
2
)
.
Therefore, the derivative of g2(δ|i = 1) w.r.t. δ is non-positive.
Suppose that the derivative of g2(δ|i) w.r.t. δ is non-positive,
where i ∈ N+. From (28), we have
g2(δ|i + 1) = g2(δ|i) − log(2) + log
(
1 + i(δ − 2)
δ + 2i(δ − 2)
)
.
Taking its derivative, we have
g′2(δ|i + 1) = g′2(δ|i) +
i
1 + i(δ − 2) −
2i + 1
δ + 2i(δ − 2)
= g′2(δ|i) +
−1
(1 + i(δ − 2))(2 + (2i + 1)(δ − 2)) .
Therefore, the derivative of g2(δ|i) w.r.t. δ is non-positive for
all fixed i.
In summary, we have g′1(δ|i) ≤ 0 and g′2(δ|i) ≤
0, and 12i
1+i(δ−2)
2+(2i+1)(δ−2) · δ · PG (X1 = i + 1|n = 2i + 1) =
exp (g1(δ|i) · g2(δ|i)). Combing these results together, we have
proved that the derivative of δ · Pe1(n = 2i + 2) w.r.t. δ
is non-positive. Therefore, the proof of Corollary 10-ii is
completed. 
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